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PUBLIC VALUES AND CORPORATE FIDUCIARY 
LAW 
William W. Bratton· 
Politics have returned to a leading role in corporate law 
discussions. A few years ago they hardly mattered at all. In 
the mid-1980's, when takeovers and high leverage 
restructurings were still gathering momentum, it briefly looked 
as if market discipline might have the determinant role in 
corporate governance. It also briefly looked as if a 
microeconomic paradigm would determine the future shape of 
corporate law. Since corporate law is about wealth 
maximization, it seemed to follow that its framework would be 
set by reference to economics, the discipline that tells us how 
to maximize. 
The point did not carry in the long run, however. The 
economy turned down, and, as credit tightened, takeovers and 
restructurings stopped ab ruptly. Meanwhile , state 
governments enacted antitakeover legislation1 that was prima 
facie inefficient under the economic paradigm. The states, 
serving the interests of management and labor (but mostly 
management), thereby opted to ignore a decade of law review 
articles. The economic paradigm, as a result, failed to manifest 
itself in the law on the critical governance point. The legal 
corporation emerged looking a bit less like a nexus of contracts 
and a bit more like a contract failure. The failure was political. 
Absent an effective politics of corporate governance, even the 
most economically correct policies do not find their way into 
the law. 
* © copyright 1992 William W. Bratton, Professor of Law, Rutgers School of 
Law-Newark. My thanks to David Carlson, John C. Coffee, Jr., Drucilla Cornell, 
Arthur Jacobson, Joe McCahery, David Milton, Patrick Ryan, participants in the 
Corporate Accountability and Control Workshop at the University of Warwick, and 
participants in faculty seminars at Stanford and Tulane Law Schools for their 
comments on earlier drafts. All views and errors are mine. 
1. See infra note 28. 
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Commentary on the politics of corporate law has appeared in 
response.2 Much of this work is strategic, addressing the 
question of how to get the politics to follow the economics.3 But 
other work pauses to explain the political forces at work in 
recent years and to describe how politics interacts in the law 
with economic concerns.4 This Article pursues the latter line of 
inquiry. It considers the extent to which public values that are 
not consonant with the normative dictates of a microeconomic 
paradigm legitimately can be integrated into corporate law. 
Toward this end, this Article takes up a specific question: can 
fiduciary constraints legitimately be imposed on corporate 
actors, when those constraints do not serve the expectations 
and values of the corporate actors themselves, and instead 
vindicate values important only to society at large?5 Or, 
restating the question in economic terms: Can corporate 
fiduciary rules that realize either no cost savings or increased 
net costs be justified? Stated either way, this is the hard 
political question respecting corporate fiduciary law. 
To concretize the question with a hypothetical, imagine a 
pair of fiduciary rules. The first tightens the corporate 
opportunity constraint to bar all outside business pursuits by 
officers and directors of public corporations.6 The second 
2. The leading work is historical. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of 
American Corporate Finance, 9 1  COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991 )  (political diminution of 
the power of financial institutions). 
3. The commentary articulating new paths for investor control of management 
in the absence of takeovers is most prominent. See, e.g. , Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reiner Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional 
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 ( 1991 ); Bernard S. Black, Sharelwlder Passivity 
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 ( 1 990). 
4. See JefTrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets and Courts, 9 1  COLUM. L. 
REV. 193 1  ( 199 1 )  (socio-histoJical account of Delaware lawmaking); Lyman Johnson, 
The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 
TEX. L. REV. 865 (1990 ) (Delaware takeover law viewed in wider social and 
political context). 
5. A£ used in this Article, the term "corporate actors" encompasses both 
managers and shareholders. 
6. The traditional corporate oppo1tunity restraint prohibits directors and 
officers from wrongfully appropriating a corporate opportunity. See PRINCIPLES OF 
CORP. GOVERNANCE § 5.04 (Am. Law lnst. Tentative Draft No. 5, 1 986). For a 
proposed "tightening" of this constraint, such as that set forth in the hypothetical, 
see Victor Brudney & Robert C. Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1022-42 ( 198 1 )  (recommending categorical prohibition of full­
time executives of public corporations from taking any other active business 
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applies the majority to minority fiduciary duty so as to impose 
a "business purpose" standard that discourages a small class of 
cost saving mergers.7 Both rules have been imposed as a 
matter of public policy to protect investors. Either one could be 
modelled as wealth maximizing to the corporation and its 
actors, given the right assumptions. But in this exercise, 
different assumptions will be made. Assume that although 
neither rule significantly impairs the conduct of business ' 
neither follows from the values or transactional expectations of 
the average manager or investor.8 The first regulation is 
stipulated to be cost neutral; the second is stipulated to have a 
slight cost. Can one, the other, or both be justified under any 
legal theory plausible at this time? 
The question takes us to the frontier of corporate fiduciary 
law. This Article explores possibilities for an affirmative 
answer. It experiments with arguments for regulating internal 
corporate conduct based on community values and process,9 
drawing in particular on the concept of communicative 
action.10 In so doing, it projects a framework for public 
justification of fiduciary constraint that avoids reliance on the 
moribund notion of the corporation as a delegation of sovereign 
authority.11 
opportunities). 
7. Although the "business purpose" rule is no longer the law of Delaware, 
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), overruled by Weinberger v. 
UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983), the hypothetical concerns the cost 
implications of the rule, and not its doctrinal soundness. Cf. Victor Brudney & 
Marvin A. Chirel stein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. 
L. REV. 297, 313-25 (1974) (suggesting that gains resulting from mergers of parent 
into subsidiary corporations be divided equally between the parent and subsidiary 
as a percentage of pre-merger values). 
8. With respect to the cost neutral regulation, discussed infra, this 
assumption must eventually be relaxed. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24 for the meaning of "process" as 
used in this A1ticle. 
10. Jurgen Habermas has articulated the importance of communicative action. 
See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
11. Concession theory asse1ts that corporations must derive positive authority 
from the state. Sovereigns have made this claim since Roman times. John Dewey, 
The Historic Bachgrollnd of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 666 
(1926). The theory enjoyed vitality in the United States during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Thereafter, the practice of ministerial incorporation by states 
caused the theory's imagery to lose plausibility. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The 
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 
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I. STRATEGIES FOR JUSTIFYING COST NEUTRAL A!'J"D COSTLY 
FIDUCIARY LAW 
A. The Contract Paradigm and the Traditional Concept of 
the Fiduciary 
Both of the proposed hypothetical regulations are difficult to 
justify. Certainly, no support can be found under the "contract 
paradigm" that dominated corporate legal theory in the 
1980's.12 The paradigm justifies fiduciary regulation only on �· 
proof of wealth maximizing consequences,13 and requires a 
showing of contract failure to make the proof. In a thick stack 
of articles, commentators make this proof, and thus 
"contractually" justify the traditional fiduciary bar against 
management self-dealing.14 But the hypothetical facts as stated 
here include no contract failure between management and 
investors that would support the hypothetical regulations. Nor 
do the facts stipulate any externality reducible to dollars and 
cents that might justify intervention on behalf of economic 
interests outside of the corporation.15 In short, neither 
433-36 (1989) [hereinafter Bratton, Nexus of Contracts Appraisal]. But cf RoBERT 
HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 3-33 (1979) (explaining the historical 
background of the concession theory of corporate authority). 
12. The "contract paradigm" views the corporation as a "nexus of contracts" 
between and among investors and management, investors and investors, suppliers 
and the entity, and consumers and the entity. See Victor Brudney, Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 
1403 (1985). 
13. The "contract" is microeconorrilc. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
14. This "contractually" justified bar is, however, a narrowly construed version 
of the traditional fiduciary bar. Information imbalances and barriers to collective 
action prevent dispersed shareholders from substituting a more effective 
contractual set of conflict of interest regulations. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Mandatory I Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The 
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989). 
15. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88-89 (1989) (noting an 
academic consensus respecting intervention for paternalistic reasons and in respect 
I 
{ 
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hypothetical regulation serves an economic welfare function. 
Moreover, the traditional doctrinal conception of fiduciary 
duty provides little support for the hypothetical regulations. 
Corporate fiduciary law, as traditionally conceived, rests on an 
ethical case against abuses of position by self-interested 
managers. But, at the same time, it recognizes that the self­
interested pursuits of corporate actors are necessary and 
legitimate in many circumstances.16 Tensions arise between 
these concomitant considerations. Traditional corporate 
fiduciary doctrine mediates these tensions with a rule-and­
exceptions approach. It thereby pursues the generally-shared 
goal of wealth maximization, while simultaneously attempting 
to protect and perpetuate the trust and good will that suffuses 
complex economic relationships.17 
We can describe a conceptual tie between the hypothetical 
regulations and the ethic that motivates traditional fiduciary 
doctrine: the hypothetical regulations impose business 
sacrifices on managers for the benefit of shareholders in order 
to protect the trust reposed in managers by the 
shareholders.18 This description lacks justificatory force, 
however. Under our assumptions, the shareholders do not 
expect or rely on the particular constraint the regulations 
impose.19 Traditional doctrine only protects the interests of 
of externalities). 
16. For example, a contract between a director or officer and the corporation 
can be an optimal investment for both parties, when the corporation's rate of 
return is commensurate with what it would receive from a third party. 
17. I set out this mediative description of traditional fiduciary law in detail in 
William W. Bratton, Welfare and Good Will in Corporate Fiduciary Law, (March 1, 
1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Bratton, Welfare 
and Good Will]. 
18. The different hypothetical regulations benefit different groups of 
shareholders. The entire class of shareholders is protected by the first hypothetical 
regulation, and a more narrowly defined class of minority shareholders by the 
second. 
19 . In contemporary commentary in the conventional mode, strong, 
antimanagerialistic fiduciary regulations tend to be justified as protections of 
shareholder expectations, based on casual empirical assumptions. See PRINCIPLES 
OF CORP. GoVERNAJ<CE § 2.0 1 cmt. h (Am. Law Inst. Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984) 
(management may not take ethical considerations into account if doing so "would 
be likely to violate the fair expectations of the corporation's shareholders taken as 
a group"). See also David M. Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The 
Synthesizing Thread in Corporate Doctrine, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 184, 219-20 (1979); 
----Elm''-"''�''· 
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actors inside the corporation, looking to those actors to define 
their own interests. The hypothetical regulations, in contrast, 
follow from outside ethical instructions as to appropriate 
conduct inside corporations. Furthermore, a justificatory base 
in traditional fiduciary good will would be debatable even if 
the regulations' origins in outside values presented no problem. 
Ethical considerations do not support fiduciary constraint 
under the traditional conception without reference to economic 
welfare.20 . When outside ethics and economics conflict, 
traditional doctrine offers no program to direct and legitimize 
results. 
B. Community Standards and Process 
Absent support from traditional fiduciary doctrine, the 
hypothetical regulations' proponent must fall back on the 
values of members of the outside community. This public 
justification presupposes a consensus behind the values that 
motivate the regulations. The argument proceeds as follows. 
Corporate affairs are not conducted as a matter of juridical 
right; therefore, corporate behavior may be restricted even in 
the absence of a concrete economic externality. In such cases, 
the externality that prompts the regulation is one of values. 
Sordid business practices, enforced in law, inflict nonpecuniary 
injury. If prominent business people pursue self-interest 
according to values materially different from those held outside 
of the corporation, legal endorsement of their conduct injures 
the community's wider sense of itself. 
This public justification view is problematic, since corporate 
wealth maximization is also a community value. We only suffer 
corporations to benefit from low cost production in the first 
place.21 
At this point, a distinction opens between cost neutral and 
costly regulations. The community consensus assertion is more 
plausible empirically and carries more justificatory force with 
respect to the cost neutral regulation. All other things being 
Victor Bmdney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 
MICH. L.  REV. 259, 299 (1966). Here, the stipulated facts block these assumptions. 
20. See Bratton, Welfare and Good Will, supra note 17. 
21. Si'e Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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equal, the community will support vindication of its values. 
With a cost neutral regulation, we can even expect the 
acquiescence of actors inside the corporation. We can ascribe to 
them a desire to "harmonize"22 their relationships with values 
prevalent outside. With the costly regulation, however, all 
other things are not equal. The insiders' urge to harmonize 
diminishes as constraints become costly. Impairing the wealth 
of those inside the corporation solely to vindicate outside 
values comes across as a weak exercise of distributive justice. 
Thus, the "external," community justification must be stronger 
than the mere desire to harmonize. 
C. Possibilities for Cost Neutral Regulation under the Trust 
Model 
The question regarding cost neutral regulation, thus 
justified in theory, is whether cost neutral fact patterns ever 
show up in practice. The economic paradigms insist that they 
do not. These paradigms include a presumption that regulation 
is always materially costly, absent a strong and precise 
showing to the contrary.23 
But the point can be argued the other way, given the usual 
absence of empirical proof. First, we look behind the stipulated 
cost neutrality of the hypothetical corporate opportunity 
prohibition. It turns out that a "cost neutral" prohibition 
cannot exist without some consonance with the interests of 
actors inside the corporation. Since regulation is intrinsically 
costly, cost neutrality implies a cost/benefit stand off; thus, 
some economic benefit must result. Such a stand off is easily 
posited for a corporate opportunity bar. On the one hand, the 
regulation causes costs in cases where managers otherwise 
would pursue individual entrepreneurial projects about which 
22. C{. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO 
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 67-69 ( 1980) (describing harmonization of 
relational conf1ict). 
23. See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance 
of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 843 ( 1987)  (proposing that new corporate law 
should be formulated only if the regulator has complete positive command of the 
agency cost picture); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of 
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 64 
(1990) (asse1ti ng an explicit normative presumption against regulation throughout 
the law of contract). 
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their investors would be indifferent.24 But benefits would follow 
to the extent that the rule caused managers to pursue 
investor-beneficial results in a more single-minded way. 
Arguably, this actualized professionalism would result in 
improved production and a lower cost of capital, and so, would 
be supported by the traditional conception of fiduciary duty. 
The point carries even if shareholders do not expect the 
protection ex ante. Shareholder expectations have an inchoate 
aspect. The law helps shape them, and can have cost beneficial 
consequences as it does so. 
Since we now have plausible arguments both for and against 
the regulation, the matter comes down to the usual contest 
between regulatory and antiregulatory burdens of proof. Today, 
more so than at any time in the last decade, a strong case can 
be made for stepped up fiduciary regulation under a trust 
model of the corporation, and against the economic 
presumption opposing regulation. The failure of market 
mechanisms to adequately control management conduct is once 
more widely acknowledged.25 Academic policy talk, however, 
remains in a deregulatory mode. Current work looks to 
institutional investor self-help for solutions26 while avenues 
toward less costly legal regulation remain unexplored. Yet such 
avenues exist. Corporate fiduciary law has always had a 
tentative, experimental pattern of application;27 today, it can 
even have a conditional pattern. 
A decade of contractual thinking about corporate law has 
left us with the tools to create statutes that regulate corporate 
conduct while leaving open paths for contractual innovation 
within particular corporations. Conditional regulation, subject 
to opting out in particular corporations by shareholder vote, 
24. Also, some talented people, discouraged by the directive to serve others, 
might avoid executive positions in public corporations, and instead pursue careers 
only in closely-held corporate enterp1-ises. 
25. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 17-23 (1991) (management opportunism as an 
imluence on the development of state law); Gilson & Kraakrnan, supra note 3; 
Black, supra note 3.  
26. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3 (privately sponsored corps of 
independent directors); Black, supra note 3 (cost beneficial model of independent 
action by large institutional holders). 
27. See Bratton, Welfare and Good Will, supra note 17. 
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has become everyday business.28 Indeed, opting out is the great 
gift to regulation from the "nexus of contracts." Unfortunately, 
up to now, it has been used to legitimate protective 
management innovation; however, this device would be better 
used in the service of a more professionalized model of 
management conduct. The regulatory improvements pursued 
piecemeal by today's institutional investor activists-such as 
secret ballots, independent director majorities on compensation 
committees, constraints on golden parachutes,29 and limits on 
28. The most dramatic and widespread legislative movement toward opting out 
concerns the duty of care. This reform movement began in 1986 w hen Delaware 
amended its corporation law to permit corporations to amend their certificates to 
exclude directors' liability for breaches of the duty of care. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1990). By now at least thirty-five states have followed. 
For a list of citations, see Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: 
A ttempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate 
Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 381 n.30 (1988). Additional states include: 
ALAsKA STAT. § 10.06.210(l)(N) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-48.5 (1988 & Supp. 
1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54(la) (1987 & Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (1988). 
These amendments respond not to the contractarian law review commentary, 
but to a controversial decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, Smith v. Van 
Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). There the court took the duty of care in an 
unexpected and potentially expensive direction, finding a board of directors liable 
for negligent approval of a corporate control transaction. Coming at a time when 
insurance markets were already in a state of disruption due to expanding legal 
liabilities, Van Gorhum precipitated a minor corporate insurance crisis. See R. 
Link Newcomb, Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for 
Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1987). No similar legislative movement 
against the duty of loyalty po1tends. The duty of care amendments employ the 
opting out device in order to solve the problem created by Van Corkum. 
Opting out shows up in other venues as well. Mechanisms for opting out of 
mandatory provisions of federal securities laws have been proposed but not 
promulgated. See Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate 
Control: Advance Notice of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 
23,486 [ 1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 84,018, at 88,199 
(July 31, 1986) (discussing permitting companies substantial freedom to opt out of 
federal tender afTer rules). The opting out device is also widely used in state 
tender afTer defense statutes, presumably as part of a strategy to bolster the 
statute's constitutionality. Typically, the board has a stated number of days after 
the statute's e!Tective date to resolve not to be governed by the statute. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(2) (1983 & Supp. 1990). Opt out provisions appear in 
all three of the cunent models of takeover statute: fair price (acquirer must offer 
the same consideration in a subsequent merger as in acquisition of control block), 
asset freeze (prohibition of business combination with acquirer for stated number 
of years) and control share (voting rights denied to control shares until 
disinterested shareholders vote to grant them). 
29. See Leslie Wayne, Seehing to Stay out of Proxy Battles, N.Y. TIMES, April 
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compensation schemes lacking ties to corporate performance 
results30-should also be pursued as law reform suggestions 
under the fiduciary rubric. Liberal use of the opting out device 
can minimize the risks attending such regulatory experiments 
and put the burden of justification on management, where it 
belongs under the traditional fiduciary concept. 
D. The Process Case for Costly Fiduciary Regulation 
Returning to the hypothetical costly rule, we find it in some 
trouble due to independent ethical objections. Under the facts 
as stated, corporate actors do not want the regulation. When 
the state imposes a fiduciary rule on unwilling subjects, its 
sentimental grounding becomes attenuated. Here, outsiders 
want to impose their conception of appropriate business 
relationships, even though their conception entails wealth 
constraining effects. As the motivating values are transformed 
into legal constraints, their sentimental roots atrophy 
noticeably. The values become a construct-a reified ethic of 
good will toward other corporate participants operating as law. 
Imposition of the construct can even mask an expression of ill 
will from one group to another. Therefore, what started as an 
aspiration for the ethical conduct of business becomes not only 
a construct, but an oppressive one. 
A related political objection also arises. Without a manifest 
and compelling consensus behind it, the costly rule looks elitist 
because it makes its subjects worse off in order to vindicate 
values important to a subgroup of actors with power in the 
lawmaking process.31 Such elitism prompts democratic 
opposition. We tend to find open pursuit of self-interest in 
business contexts more consonant with democratic values than 
business regulation designed to vindicate ethical values, at 
8, 1991, at Dl. 
30. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 891 (citing Michael C. Jensen & 
Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 225, 227 (1990)) (noting the low correlation between the compensation of 
managers and the economic perfo1mance of their companies). 
31. Anthony T. Kronman, A Comment on Dean Clark, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1748, 1754-55 (1989) (positing that elitist practices serve the interests of the 
institution and its principal custodians, without regard to the effect of such 
practices on those who must Jive under them). 
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least absent the cleansing effect of a democratic process. 32 
These ethical and political objections can be answered, 
however, if not categorically rebutted. On the ethical point, it 
can be noted that state-imposed morality is more tolerable in 
business contexts than in other contexts. The stakes only go to 
small amounts of wealth and not to significant components of 
other people's identities. A strong political consensus, 
therefore, may ameliorate the ethical objection. In short, we 
may, as a community, decide to be less well-off in order to 
pursue a notion of the good. 
The political objections require an inspection of the 
regulatory process. Let us assume that the costly regulation is 
judge-made law that carries no opt out privilege. It is imposed 
by a state court acting within our existing institutional system 
of corporate lawmaking. This system, despite its bad 
reputation,33 carries process guarantees-particularly in the 
rare case where it rouses itself to constrain self-interested 
management conduct. In the system, state and federal 
authorities interact with one another and with the various 
communities inside and outside of business.34 Delaware 
lawmakers pay special heed to management and capital 
interests,35 subject to the implied constraint of federal 
preemption for the wider public interest. Management and 
capital also make their interests felt in federal lawmaking 
processes. Professional organizations, scholars and other 
commentators all provide a background of discussion. All 
quarters accord considerable respect to economic welfare 
concerns. 
Viewed cumulatively, this lawmaking process supports a 
32. Cf. John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1021, 1026-35 (1982) (the assumption of public functions by lawyers is 
undemocratic; social decisions should be made by individuals pursuing self-interest 
in the market and by elected officials). 
33. See, e.g., William L. Ca1y, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (suggesting that a lack of federal 
standards for corporate governance encourages states to participate in a "race for 
the bottom," thereby allowing corporate standards to deteriorate). 
34. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 Nw. U .L. REV. 54 2, 564-66 ( 1990) (noting stronger political limits on 
federal interference with corporate governance than on similar state interference). 
35. Symposium, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 
783-86 (1987) (remarks of Bayless Manning). 
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positivist defense of the costly regulation. As a practical 
matter, it is unlikely that any regulation emerging from this 
system could present a cognizable threat to democratic 
concerns or to long-term economic welfare. So long as the 
underlying conflict between welfare and the competing ethic is 
controverted and discussed, it cannot be said that the 
regulation's cost is imposed in disregard of anyone's material 
needs. The existence of controversy and discussion also imply 
the presence of legitimating "consensus" views. Finally, given 
the historic pattern of experimental applications of legal 
constraint in corporate fiduciary law,36 the regulation implies 
no permanent, universal theoretical assertion of right. Born of 
controversy, the regulation amounts to a judgment made at a 
given moment in reference to perspectives particular to that 
moment. It remains subject to revision. 
Although problematic in the abstract, the costly regulation 
has ties to a system and, through the system, to a wider 
consensus. In effect, the regulation manifests a mediation of a 
conflict of values within the system. If we see it as a mediation 
rather than as a wider assertion of the primacy of values 
conflicting with economic welfare, its legitimacy need not 
depend on a perfect fit with a welfarist theoretical construct. 
II. PUBLIC FIDUCIARY LAW AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
A. Instrumental and Communicative Action 
The foregoing lawyerly appeal to the mediative force of 
process in the defense of the costly regulation carries weight. 
But, taken alone, it looks uncompetitive as an intelligible 
justification when compared to today's well-articulated theories 
36. For example, coUJts have imposed strong fiduciary bars, only to retrench 
later, in cases involving: exercises of call lights, compare Zahn v. Transamerica 
Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 194 7), with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 
(3d Cir. 1956) (damages phase of same case); sales of control b locks at premium 
prices, compare Pearlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 
U.S. 952 (1955), and Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969), 
with Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979); and takeout 
mergers, compare Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) with 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
For a discussion of judicial experimentation with the duty of care, see supra 
note 28 and accompanying text. 
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of welfare and contract.37 We can, however, strengthen the 
process case by reference to dialogic theory,38 and its 
constituent concept of communicative action, as articulated in 
the work of Jiirgen Habermas. 
Habermas39 employs a more capacious concept of action and 
. 37. See David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory, 
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 10, 13 (1989) (doubting that law contains an "inner rationality" 
independent from social theory). 
38. Ethical theory centered on dialogue is surprisingly well-suited to legal 
theory. Like most legal theory, it presupposes a skeptical view of substantive 
ethical theory. 
ObseJ"Ve the competing substantive claims made by the several philosophical 
paradigms operating today. The ideal of rational justification can be pursued 
within the utilita,;an paradigm. It can also be pursued in the Rawlsian 
paradigm-that is, rationality as guided by the principles that rational and self­
interested persons in a hypothetical situation of equal liberty would agree to 
accept. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971). It can be pursued in 
other paradigms as welL See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTiCE? WHICH 
RATIONALITY? 2-3 (1988); Bruce A. Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 12-15 
(1989). In legal theory today, the other paradigms are essentialist. They employ 
what Ackerman characteJ;zes as the "trumping" strategy-isolating a single 
generally accepted value and focusing on its political implications so as to solve 
our disagreements. /d. at 14-15. 
No agreement results from the discourse between and among all these 
paradigms. In the end, therefore, the paradigms provide a means "for a more 
accurate and informed definition of disagreement rather than for progress toward 
its resolution." MACINTYRE, supra, at 3. Nor does any theory seem to answer 
practical ethical questions-we are unable "within our culture to unite conviction 
and rational justification." /d. at 6. 
Dialogism accepts the shortcomings of the competing substantive theories 
and turns to the process of discussion. It posits participants taking roles in an 
ideal conversation. It then constructs theoretical pictures of these actors as they 
disagree about ethical p;nciples and nevertheless, through dialogue, derive bases 
of agreement. We get a variety of ideal conversations because different dialogic 
theoJ;sts shape the roles in ideal conversations with different norms. 
39. According to Habe1mas, moral theory should "clarifY the universal core of 
our moral intuitions"; it cannot make any substantive contribution. J\irgen 
Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to 
Discourse Ethics?, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1989), 
reprinted in 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 38, 53 (1989) [hereinafter Habermas, Morality and 
Ethical Li{e ]. 0ee also Albrecht Wellmer, Reason, Utopia, and the "Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, . . . in HA13 E H MAS AND MODERNITY 35, 53 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 
1985) 
This is a rcOexive conception of human communication according to 
which validity claims, because they can only emerge from the sphere of 
communication, can also only be redeemed in the sphere of human 
discourse: there are no possible extema.l sources of validity, since the 
sphere of validity is---{;onccptually is-identical with the sphere of human 
speech. 
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power than the concept that informs most American legal 
theory. The usual "instrumental action" m odel is  
teleological-an individual or group pursues a set purpose 
wherein power derives from the possibility of forcing one's will 
on others.40 Habermas, drawing on Arendt,41 identifies a 
different source of power-power as the capacity to agree in 
uncoerced communication on some community action. This 
power may also be realized in action, but the model of action is 
different.42 In this "communicative action," the participating 
subjects voluntarily agree. Habermas articulates a theory of 
rationality based on this communicative action. He argues that 
instrumental or strategic action and rationality intermix in 
society with action and rationality based on reciprocal 
understanding, shared knowledge and mutual trust.43 Within 
this framework, he sets out a procedural ethical theory. He 
posits an ideal ethical discussion that includes the identities 
and perspectives of all sorts of people, in which valid norms 
must meet a strict standard of acceptance by all participants.44 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
The writings of Bruce Ackerman offer a different statement of the basic 
dialogic point. A�cording to Ackerman, "moral truth" is what we conclude in an 
"ideal speech situation." Ackerman, supra note 38, at 7. See also BRUCE A 
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 355-59 (1980). 
40. JORGEN HABERMAS, Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL-POLITICAL PROFILES 173, 173-74 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 
1985). 
41. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 199-205 (1958). 
42. Arendt notes that: 
Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, 
where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not 
used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to 
violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities. 
ld. at 200. 
43. Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State, and the Modem/Postmodern 
Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1067 (1988). 
44. First, all concerned must consent to the valid norms in their role as 
participants in the discourse. Second, the consequences and side effects of the 
general observance of the norm for the satisfaction of each person's particular 
interests must be accepted by all participants. Habermas, Morality and Ethical 
Life, supra note 39, at 40. 
American legal theory offers contrasting pictures in this dialogic mode. For 
example, Cornell discards Haben as' procedural limits. The result is dialogue in 
pursuit of an ideal of the good. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, From the Lightlwuse: 
The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1687, 1696-1700, 1709, 1711-12 (1990) (arguing that the "Good, or the Law 
.i j 
l 
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B. Communicative Action and Corporate Law 
The distinction between instrumental and communicative 
action can be brought to an everyday legal subject like 
corporate law with instructive results. This exercise justifies 
and helps explain the doctrine's diverse substance and 
mediative operation. 
Corporate law guides and constrains instrumental action. It 
directs corporate actors and makes available a structure in 
which they can exercise directive power over one another. 
Corporate law also includes, and results from, conversations. 
In our society, corporate power depends to some extent on 
ongoing consent. This approving consensus continues as 
corporations' many constituents make and deal with corporate 
law. When people talk about how corporations should be 
governed and what the duties of corporate actors should be, 
they take part in the ongoing endorsement of corporate 
power.45 Corporate law, viewed as a result of this conversation, 
of Law," should be understood as being universal and open to possible ethical 
reinterpretation); DIUcilla Cornell, The Poststructuralist Challenge to the Ideal of 
Community, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 992, 1017-1022 (1987) [ hereinafter Cornell, 
Poststructuralist Challenge] (discussing what Adorno and Derrida are telling us 
about the ethical and political significance of difference, the dangers of violent 
closure and the logic of identity). Acken an describes an ideal conversation with a 
practical imperative behind it. His actors disagree on ethical questions but 
nevertheless seek to solve pmblems of living together. Ackerman, supra note 38, at 
8. Ackerman makes dialogism an obligation of the citizen in the liberal state. This 
obligation to talk about moral disagreements arises precisely because the liberal 
state avoids imposing moralities. /d. at 10. The participants exercise conversational 
restraint; they stick to the available public premises and filter out inappropriate 
personal moralities. /d. at 19. Habermas' participants, says Ackerman, look to 
ultimate conversational victory in some far-distant ideal speech situation. His 
participants, on the other hand, concentrate on getting things done in this world 
without compromising their moral beliefs. Id. The result is an ideal of dialogue 
with a direct tie to the juridical, political and economic conversations familiar to 
American law teachers. 
Dialogic theory has been applied to a number of legal subjects. See, e. g. , 
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (constitutional law); 
Handler, supra note 43 (administrative law); DIUcilla Cornell, Dialogic Reciprocity 
and the Critique of Employment at Will, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1575 (1989) (labor 
law) ;  Jonathan M. Hyman, Three Ethics of Lawyering: Discretionary Ethics in the 
Contexts of Lawye1Js Tasks (Paper for UCLA-Warwick Second International 
Clinical Conference, Sept. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(lawyer's ethics). 
45 .  The objective o f  this conversation, ultimately, is general assent to a vision 
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is a residuum of communicative actions. Thus it may be 
conceived as a dialogue in part. 
Since assent to corporate institutions manifests itself 
through communication over time, in practice such assent 
never coalesces around a permanent and universal set of ideas. 
Accordingly, the law and legal theory connected with the 
consensus cannot be expected to wholly take the form of tight 
and consistent deductions from first principles. The law does, 
nevertheless , contain extended sequences meeting the 
standards of instrumental rationality. These sequences follow 
from the ever-present corporate marching order to go out and 
produce cheaply. This basic order is executed in a multitude of 
contexts, however, among a multitude of participants. In a 
democratic environment, therefore, we expect to see routine 
departures from the instrumental pattern which may be 
justifiable with standards of communicative rationality. 
We begin to see why diverse principles persist in corporate 
law and theory. In practice, corporations have a complex of 
foundations. They are welfarist instruments. They are also 
nexuses of interpersonal relationships with ethical 
implications. They advance each participant's self-interest, but 
they also demand individual sacrifices to effectuate collective 
goals. They are nexuses of contract relationships. At the same 
time, corporations are separate entities with identifiable, albeit 
reified, contents and a cognizable social presence. They 
encompass relational contracts and discrete contracts. They 
result from free contract and yet entail empowerment and 
dependence. They amount to hierarchical power structures in 
some respects, and artifacts of arms length contracting in 
others. 
Corporate law's mediative aspect follows from sensitivity to 
this complexity, and draws on all of the foregoing conceptual 
bases . In so doing, it avoids the foundationalist error of 
excluding one basis as a function of respecting another. 
Instead, it mediates between the various components and 
norms in the complex, toward the end of mediating between 
and among the people involved with corporations. Corporate 
law's mediative aspect thereby accepts disagreement on norms 
of appropriate corporate conduct. 
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as an integral part of social and economic life, and helps us 
live with institutions despite disagreement. Accordingly, an 
unexpected aspect of consequentialist urgency attends this 
acceptance of diversity--corporate law must encompass entity 
and contract, fiduciary and contract, state and contract, trust 
and agency, self-interest and cooperation, welfare and good 
will, and mandate and facilitation, if it is to serve as a nexus 
of communicative action contributing to corporate institutional 
stability .46 
This dialogic justification of conventional corporate law has 
obvious limitations. Perfect consensus occurs only in theory. 
Legal conversations, moreover,  are a far from ideal vehicle 
even for an imperfect consensus, and proceed subject to 
substantial restraints . First, participants in doctrinal 
conversations take limited, tradition-bound roles. They assume 
a posture of neutrality, treat reifications as realities, and so 
on.47 Although ethics operate in these conversations, they show 
up only indirectly. 48  Second, the stylized and professional 
nature of legal conversation limits opportunities for 
participation. Despite the constraints, however, the talk 
nevertheless includes a range of perspectives and goes on in a 
number of venues. We have a proliferation of lawmaking 
agencies, governmental and quasi-governmental. In academic 
venues, corporate legal theory now includes much economics. 
In other venues, we seem to have a lot of corporate lawyers 
46.  Reference to communicative action also reinforces the traditional conception 
of  fiduciary duty, which amalgamates welfarism and an ethic of goo d  will. This 
picture of instrumental and communicative action presupposes a human actor 
oriented toward both agreement with others and pursuit of self-interest. See 
HABERMAS, supra note 40, at 179. Conventional fiduciary duty presupposes a 
similarly modelled person. 
4 7. C{. Ackerman, supra note 38, at 12 (describing the liberal tradition as a 
series of e !To1ts to provi de conversational models that enable political discussants 
to talk in neutral terms). Sre also ACKERMAN, supra note 39, at 6 1-62, 333-34. By 
"neutrality," At:kerman refers to the character of the conversation and not to that 
of  the con sequences . lcl. at 6 1 .  
48. Thus the corporate law judge making a n  ethical assertion will probably 
cite to C ardozo's "punct i l io o f  an honor the most sensitive" language before 
sermonizing directly. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  
Our ambivalence toward business morality results in a division of fimction. 
Sermonizing about the good is professionalized and assigned to places of  worship.  
There, moralizing proceeds without the force o f  positive law and without 
i mmediate fi n ancial consequences for dereliction of duty. 
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talking to clients about corporate law. Corporate matters also 
figure into popular politics. 
C. Primary and Supplemental Elements of Doctrine 
Return to the hypothetical costly fiduciary constraint and 
assume that, for most people most of the time,  economic 
welfare determines the appropriate regulatory decision. In nine 
out of ten such cases the welfarist result obtains and no 
noticeable controversy follows. Given the normative power of 
consensus, therefore, a question arises-why not change the 
result in the tenth case and erase all elements of fiduciary law 
that do not work as instruments in the production of maximum 
wealth? We thereby achieve consistency. And, even though the 
result in the tenth case now fails to garner a consensus, in the 
long run views may change. 
A number of responses meet this proposition. For one thing, 
dialogue remains valuable in all ten cases. The members of the 
hypothetical welfarist consensus may need to participate in the 
dialogue in order to reconfirm their position as times change 
and events occur. Furthermore, those outside of the consensus 
are nevertheless members of the polity that makes this 
welfarist law. Like a judge rendering a written, reasoned 
opinion, the consensus must explain and justify its position to 
the outsiders through this conversation. In so doing, it 
recognizes the legitimacy of the outside position and those who 
hold it.49 
In addition, people may have inner conflicts that need 
sorting out through conversation. Law, to the extent that it 
stems from political communication, has a wide base of values 
and principles. Participants on both sides of a legal issue may 
subscribe to all of the principles that diverge over it. In the 
case of corporate duties, for example, cost does not become the 
sole guiding value because of the constant political possibility 
that the public may choose to sacrifice wealth in favor of some 
other value . By thus opening law to the whole body of public 
49. See Haben as, Morality and Ethical Life, supra note 39, at 45 (the degree 
of solidarity and growth of welfare are not the only indicators of the quality of 
communal li fe ;  giving equal consideration to the interests of each person is also 
important). 
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values, we sacrifice its inner consistency, but we do so in order 
to make law cohere with the values at play in the outside 
political community. 
The result of such opening is that a complex of primary and 
secondary, or "supplemental," normative elements can now 
combine to make up an area of law. The supplemental 
elements accompany the law's primary norms. Although they 
do not often determine results, they do cause many dialogues 
and these dialogues have consequences.50 
Corporate law has several notorious and problematic 
supplemental strains . One such strain is its internal public 
interest component. This component has only two generally 
accepted zones of outcome determination: the charitable 
contribution privilege,51 and the duty to obey the law.52 
Otherwise, it is cited in the outcome of only a handful of 
famous cases .53 Because it performs a critical function, 
however, it persists and draws substantial attention in the 
commentary. Another supplemental strain is corporate law's 
persistent but ineffectual creditor protection doctrine.54 The 
duty of care can also be cited in this vein. A negligence 
directive, this duty works well in its accepted sphere only to 
the extent that it almost never results in liability.55 In effect, 
then, it operates as a legal formality that imposes a negligence 
50. Constancy of enforcement is not a cogent normative standard. Cf. Handler, 
supra note 43, at 1026 (administrative agencies prosecute only occasionally for the 
symbolic reason of enhancing their credibility as a law-enforcement mechanism). 
51. See, e.g. , A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J.), appeal 
dismissed, 346 U.S. 86 1 ( 1953); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GoVERNANCE § 2.01(c) (Am. 
Law Jnst. Tentative Draft. No. 2, 1984). 
52. See Pat1ick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the 
General Law of Compliance Obligation in Section 2.0l{a) of the American Law 
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413 (1991). 
53. See Shlcnsky v. W1iglcy, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Til. App. Ct. 1968) ;  Herald 
Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1094-95 ( lOth Cir. 1972). The "Time culture" 
argument in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) 
is persuasively cast in this mold in David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 251-61. 
54. See Wil liam W. Bratton, J r., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in 
a Time of Reslmcturing, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 106. 
55. When the Delaware Supreme Court made an experimental move in the 
direction of se1iously imposing the duty of care as a negligence doctrine in the 
merger and acquisition area, the result was widespread opting out. See supra note 
23. 
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liability principle in a supplemental, largely rhetorical position. 
In the case of fiduciary duties, ethical values assume this 
supplemental posture in the subgroup of situations in which no 
easily articulated cooperative wealth maximization story 
supports restraint of self-interested pursuits. Sovereign 
enforcement of an ethic of good will is problematic in these 
situations. But , if the ethical value is left in a supplemental 
posture, only a legal conversation is mandated:  The law makes 
us talk about the good, but does not force us to impose it.56 The 
regulatory "consequence" is that lawyers become ministers to a 
congregation of business persons. The business actor who turns 
around and engages in questionable maximizing on Monday 
morning is culpable in the eyes of the law, even though no one 
imposes the violent apparatus of legal enforcement. 
The anti-business activist makes an understandable 
objection to all of this-fiduciary sermons without enforcement 
consequences are pointless. Two responses are possible. First, 
the supplemental doctrine lends normative legitimacy to the 
activist's cause. In business contexts it takes a very strong 
consensus about the culpability of conduct to support 
enforcement. Such a consensus supports most applications of 
corporate fiduciary law. The ongoing presence of ethical values 
in fiduciary law, albeit in a posture short of enforcement, 
serves the activist by making change conceivable and 
legitimate. If the activist builds a new consensus, the law's 
normative structure easily accommodates it. Second, doctrinal 
conversations can be seen as nascent events of sovereign 
constraint . Where the law has a complex texture, the cautious, 
self-serving actor who approaches its edge must consult a 
lawyer. Depending on the actor's aversion to legal risk, actual 
constraint may occur at this point. Even if the actor is 
counseled to go forward, the attorney-client encounter has 
resulted in a dialogic playing out of the ethical problem, albeit 
one couched in terms of legal uncertainty.57 The maximizing 
56 . The proxy mle on shareholder proposals might also be discussed at this 
point and in this framework. See Proposals for Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-8 (1991). This mle mandates access to proxy statements for purposes of 
encouraging dialogue on ethical and policy questions. It does so at a cost, with no 
immediate beneficial consequences. See 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (1982). 
57.  An analogy can be drawn to the division of lawyers' rules of professional 
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actor, forced to suffer this conversation in order to get a full 
risk-return projection, is thus disempowered. 
Ill. PUBLIC VALUES AND PRIVATE BUSINESS 
The hypothetical costly fiduciary restraint presupposes a 
conflict of values inside and outside of the corporation. Such 
conflicts arise because corporate relationships tend to be 
informed by different values than are relationships in outside 
communities. Corporate actors share common ends, and 
corporate associations give rise to feelings of good will with 
ethical implications. For the most part, however, corporations 
are instrumental associations. They do not produce strong 
c ommunity ties constitutive of the member's self­
understanding. Very little of anyone's personal identity is 
staked in investor-manager relationships, for example.58 In 
contrast, relationships in stronger communities do define the 
participant's identity,59 at least to some extent.60 We should 
conduct into disciplinary rules and ethical considerations.  Simon notes that ethical 
considerations perform the v aluable function of acknowledging the appropriateness 
of conduct left within the zone of autonomy. William Simon, Ethical Discretion in 
Lawyering, 10 1 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1 133 ( 1988). 
Couching the lesson in doctrinal terms may lessen its momentary force as 
an ethical performance while enhancing the power of the operative ethic. Lo dged 
as a presupposition to a "legal" conversation, the ethic avoids the debilitating 
effects of lying on the moral side of the law/morality distinction. Cf id. at 1 1 14 
(conventional and unconventional responses in legal ethics categorized as legal and 
moral). 
58. The particul ar "community" rel ationship operating within a corporation will 
depend on the position of the particular pa1ticipant. Bondholders and stockholders 
of public corporations, looking for return on investment and nothing else, will see 
their participation as instrumental . Stockholders or creditors o f  close corporations 
may h ave personal ties that transform the relationship into one of common 
endeavor. 
O fficers and employees of public corporations presumably have a shifting 
combination of instrumental and sentimental ties. Here, the question arises as to 
whether the employment relationship is constitutive in the strong sense. 
Assumptions along these lines inform the movement to constrain employment at 
will. See, �.g. , Corne 11 ,  Poststmcturalist Challenge, supra note 44, at 10 17-22. A 
normative individualist might respond that no one should permit so much self­
respect to be tied to a particul ar position so as to pernilt the relationship to 
become constitutiv e .  At least since the disappe arance o f  the "realist" theory of 
corporate existence current during the first three decades of this century, see 
William W. B ratton, J r. ,  The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspectives from History, 4 1  STAL'I . L. REV. 1471 ,  1490-9 1 ( 1989), corporate law 
and theory h ave rem ained close to the individualist norm. 
59. See M!Clli\EL J .  SAJ'WEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 146-50 
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therefore expect participants in these stronger communities to 
value solidarity more highly than participants in less closely 
intertwined associational situations. The upshot is that the 
same standards of loyalty that operate outside corporations 
may not operate inside. Moreover, outsiders not fully 
conversant with the differences between corporations and 
outside communities easily might overreact to self-interested 
behavior by corporate actors. 
It does not follow, however, that corporate law should 
proceed only from inside values. Corporate law is not an 
entirely "private" proposition, even though it tends to lie on the 
private side of the broader continuum of public and private 
law. No corporate legal matter is "inside" in an absolute sense. 
Corporate actors ask for public endorsement of their 
arrangements when they turn to courts for enforcement. 
Corporate law conversations, like all legal conversations, are 
public events.6 1  The legal context and public audience 
transform the discourse, even if the substance may plausibly 
be characterized as contractual. This public aspect triggers 
evaluation, even of the insular Delaware-based corporate law 
system, in terms of public values. 
Viewed from this public perspective, corporate law exists for 
its participants as regulation and dialogue, and for the rest of 
society as performance. It is at this performative level that 
corporate law either does or does not integrate smoothly with 
the fabric of life in the stronger communities outside. 
Corporate cases, statutes, litigation documents, law review 
articles, and legislative discussions interplay with the values of 
actors outside. When people look at law, any law, they expect 
it to confirm their sense of the right and the good. A 
performance of corporate law producing this effect has 
enhanced legitimacy. Contrariwise, the proponent of corporate 
legal performance that offers no recognition to strongly held 
outside values bears an additional burden of persuasion. The 
( 1982) . 
60 . See Handler, supra note 43,  at 1071-72. Relationships define identity 
dialogically-the individual finds himself or herself through dialogue with others. 
6 1 .  And, of course, we continue to hold to the formality of state creation. On 
the "public/private" distinction and corporate law, see Bratton, Nexus of Contracts 
Appraisal, supra note 1 1, at 436-38. 
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ethic of good will may survive in corporate doctrine in part due 
to outside community notions of loyal behavior in cooperative 
situations. On this theory, the mandatory aspect of fiduciary 
rules contributes to a harmony of values which, in the long 
run, enhances the political legitimacy of corporate ventures. 
Of course, aclmowledging that the law recognizes public 
values does not "decide the case" of a particular costly 
constraint. But the aclmowledgment assists the analysis. The 
welfarist position against the regulation also draws on public 
values. The implicit assertion is that people want wealth; 
therefore, any value-laden regulation that inhibits wealth 
creation subverts the public choice for wealth. And it does so in 
order to recognize the values of an elite group,62 because if we 
block action that maximizes wealth, we deny recognition to 
those who lack wealth. This connection between wealth, public 
values and production insures that most internally generated 
corporate norms do not conflict with outside community values. 
But noting a connection between wealth and public values 
only begins discussion of the matters of identity and 
recognition at stake in the public law of corporations. In a 
world of scarcity, we each lack wealth in different degrees. 
Therefore, distributional questions arise whenever wealth 
maximization is advanced as a public value. Economic 
welfarism, pursued in the institutional context of American 
corporate law, accords full recognition only to those situated 
inside the structure of corporate production as beneficiaries, 
and to others identified with those thus situated. This leaves, 
potentially, a large population of people on the outside of a 
purely welfarist corporate law system. Many outsiders still 
might hold values which privilege maximization, exclusive of 
distributional concerns. Many outsiders may also be satisfied 
with the present structure of distribution. But obvious room for 
discussion remains. Depending on the distribution and, 
importantly, the public's sense of the distribution, an outside 
consensus could plausibly coalesce for a constraint that 
disempowers corporate insiders over a contrary rule that 
maximizes wealth. 63 
62. See Kronman, supra note 3 1, at 1754 (describing an "elitist" justifYin g  a 
rule that makes people worse ofT by reference to values from which the elitist 
derives special meaning and happiness). 
63.  Disempowen ent may be one o f  the "public" values.  Those outside 
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CoNCLUSION 
Tensions between corporate values and outside values will 
persist. So long as wealth creation depends on peoples' drive 
for self-maximization, and so long as distribution remains 
uneven, the business corporation will not be an institution 
fully satisfactory to those outside it. Corporate law mediates 
this difference. As it does so, it accords considerable respect to 
those who invest their financial and human capital in 
corporations by giving corporate actors a substantial zone of 
discretion. Occasional costly reductions of this discretion do not 
necessarily negate the base of respect. 
experience an enhancement of their fre e dom when they w atch insiders being 
constrained. 
Significan tly, " freedom" and "autonomy" do not come up as values in many 
contemporary cor·porate l aw discussions. See Kronman, supra note 3 1, a t  1753 . But 
they have an implied presence. Sufferance of corporations implies an acceptance of 
diminished freedom in producing relationships in exchange for more w e alth. The 
alternatives set forth in corporate jurisprudence otTer different concepts for 
integrating the constraints of organizational participation with political values, 
democratic or l iberal, as the case may b e .  
r 
